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AVERTING DEFENDANT-INDUCED PRE-CERTIFICATION
MOOTNESS OF CLASS ACTIONS
Susman v. Lincoln American Corp.
587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978)
Class actions are a judicially and economically efficient means of
aggregating and adjudicating substantially similar claims.' The proce-
dural prerequisites for class actions brought in federal courts are em-
bodied in rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Class
actions brought pursuant to that rule are necessarily subject to the jus-
ticiability requirement imposed by article III of the United States Con-
stitution, 3 which restricts the adjudicative power of the federal courts to
cases involving "questions presented in an adversary context" 4-in es-
sence, "real and substantial controvers[ies]." 5 If at any time during the
course of a lawsuit the controversy between the litigants is abated, the
federal court has no recourse but to declare the action moot and dis-
miss it.6
Application of this "mootness doctrine" to class actions frequently
results in inequitable outcomes which run counter to the policy under-
pinnings of the class action procedural device. 7 Typically, the problem
1. For an extensive discussion of the theories and functions of class actions, see generally
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1976) [hereinafter cited as De-
velopments].
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the repre-
sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Additionally, class actions must come under one of the three subsections of rule 23(b). See note
56 infra for the text of rule 23(b).
3. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 provides, in pertinent part:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;. . .to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party
4. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). See, e.g., Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1974).
5. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
6. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam).
7. See, e.g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (per curiam) (class action by voters who had
not fulfilled Colorado's six-month residency requirement was mooted when Colorado reduced the
residency requirement to two months and named plaintiffs were denied certification of a class of
voters who did not fulfill the amended residency requirement). For a discussion of mootness
principles as applied to class actions, see H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 1085-92
(1977); Note, Mootness On Appeal In The Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672 (1970); Note, 4
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arises when the controversy between the named plaintiff and the de-
fendant is extinguished, leaving only the unnamed class members in an
adverse posture with the defendant. Under these circumstances, the
question becomes whether the dispute between the unnamed class
claimants and the defendant is sufficient to maintain the requisite spark
of controversy within the given case. As recently as 1973, the United
States Supreme Court appeared ready to answer this question in the
negative.8 However, some lower courts continued to carve out excep-
tions and develop rationales for allowing class actions to survive the
mooting of the named plaintiff's claim.9 As a result, no uniform rules
were available to guide the federal judiciary in evaluating the status of
class actions after the extinction of the named representative's claim.
In 1975, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Sosna v.
Iowa,10 which instructed the federal courts on how to resolve tensions
between the mootness doctrine and the representative action device."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
responded to this mandate in Susman v. Lincoln American Corp. 12 by
changing the existing circuit rule regarding class actions in which the
named plaintiff's cause of action is mooted by defendants' initiative
before the district court has had a reasonable opportunity to rule on the
motion for class certification. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit aligned
itself with the Second and Fifth Circuits, which also allow class actions
to survive pre-certification mooting of the named representative's com-
plaint. 13 Susman also places the Seventh Circuit into conflict with the
Eighth Circuit, which has held that mooting of the named plaintiffs
cause of action, before class certification, mandates dismissal of the en-
tire suit.
14
This comment will establish that the Seventh Circuit's modifica-
Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts.- Part Two, Class Actions, 54 TEX. L. REV.
1310, 1320 (1976) [hereinafter cited as .4 Searchfor Princples].
8. See Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam). See
also text accompanying notes 22-30 infra.
9. Huffv. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th
Cir. 1973).
10. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
11. See text accompanying notes 103-07 infra.
12. 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978),petitionsfor cert.filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3520 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1979)
(No. 78-1169, Susman) and 47 U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1979) (No. 78-1286, Eberstadt). Sus-
man and its companion case, Flamm v. Eberstadt, were consolidated on appeal to the Seventh
Circuit. However, petitions for certiorari were filed separately in the United States Supreme
Court.
13. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.), petitionfor cert.filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3422
(U.S. Nov. 29, 1978); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
See text accompanying notes 148-74 infra.
14. Bradley v. Housing Authority of Kansas City, 512 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1975). See text
accompanying notes 175-83 infra.
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tion, in Susman, of its earlier rule in Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings &
Loan AssociationI5 was a correct response to the policy considerations
and the equitable principles involved in the process of reconciling the
class action device with the demands of the mootness doctrine. This
comment will further establish that although the court of appeals enun-
ciated a correct rule on the narrow facts of Susman, the court was ex-
cessively circumspect in refusing to adopt a broader rule similar to that
endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 16
THE STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO SUSMAN
Supreme Court Cases
Prior to 1975 and the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Sosna v. Iowa,17 the federal judiciary had no coherent standards for
analyzing and deciding the problems caused by so-called "headless"
class actions, L e., actions in which the named plaintiff's claim had been
satisfied or otherwise mooted.18 Some courts tried to develop ratio-
nales for allowing such actions to continue, t 9 while others, including
the Seventh Circuit,20 reasoned that the extinction of the named plain-
tiff's claim marked the end of all justiciable controversy within a class
action.
2'
United States Supreme Court decisions during the pre-Sosna pe-
riod were of minimal value in unraveling the conflicting analyses. In
three opinions22 handed down in successive years preceding Sosna, the
Supreme Court indicated a preference for the "no survival" tack taken
by the Seventh Circuit and other courts.23 In Laird v. Tatum,24 the
Court focused on the issue of standing to raise a claim and held that
15. 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
16. See text accompanying notes 154-70 infra.
17. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
18. See Comment, Continuation andRepresentation of Class Actions Following Dismissalof the
Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573.
19. See, e.g., Huffv. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane, 471 F.2d 853
(4th Cir. 1973). See also Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Davis v.
Caldwell, 53 F.R.D. 373 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Torres v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 318 F. Supp.
1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
20. See, e.g., Watkins v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 406 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1969).
21. Craddock v. Hill, 324 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
22. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney,
409 U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
23. In each case, the Supreme Court refused to look beyond the named plaintiffs' claims to
those of the class members to find the requisite controversy. The Court, however, did not ex-
pressly foreclose the possibility that the unnamed class plaintiffs' claims could be used to fulfill the
article III requirement. See also A Searchfor Princples, supra note 7, at 1320, 1323-24, for a
discussion of Laird, Burney, and O'Shea.
24. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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where the named plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient injury at the start of
the litigation, both the individual claim and the class action must be
dismissed for failure to meet the case or controversy requirement. 25 In-
diana Employment Security Division v. Burney26 afforded the Court an
opportunity to examine this rule with regard to the issue of mootness
since the named representative in that case was given full satisfaction
of his claim shortly after the filing of the suit. 27 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court chose not to address the issue of whether the class'
claims could supply the requisite element of controversy. 28 Instead, the
Court simply remanded the case for a ruling on whether the named
plaintiff continued to have a viable claim. 29 In O'Shea v. Littleton,
30
the case decided after Burney, the Court restated the Laird rule. As a
result of these three cases, the question of whether a class action could
survive the mooting of the named plaintiff's initially justiciable claim
was left unanswered. However, these decisions did evince reluctance
on the part of the Court to search for a case or controversy in the un-
named class members' claims.
The Sosna Decision
Sosna v. Iowa,31 a class action challenging Iowa's requirement that
divorce petitioners reside within the state one year before seeking disso-
lution of their marriages, presented the Court with another opportunity
to examine the circumstances under which a class action may survive
the mooting of the named representative's claim. Sosna moved to Iowa
from New York and shortly after her arrival filed a divorce petition in
an Iowa court. Her petition was dismissed because she failed to meet
the one year residency prerequisite. 32 She then filed suit in the federal
district court and succeeded in obtaining certification of a class of "sim-
ilarly situated" individuals.33 Following an adverse ruling by a three-
judge panel in the district court,34 Sosna appealed to the United States
25. In Laird, a class action involving military surveillance of civilian activists, the plaintiffs
failed to allege actual harm sustained as a result of the Army's conduct. The Court did not ad-
dress the issue of whether other class members could allege the requisite injury. 408 U.S. at 3, 13-
14.
26. 409 U.S. 540 (1973) (per curiam).
27. Id at 541.
28. Id at 541-42.
29. Id at 542.
30. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
31. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
32. Id at 395.
33. Id at 397.
34. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973). Although the three-judge panel in
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Supreme Court. 35 During the pendency of the appeal, Sosna fulfilled
the required year of in-state residency 36 and succeeded in procuring a
divorce in New York.37 The threshold question on certiorari thus be-
came whether the entire action was moot in light of the satisfaction of
the named plaintiff's cause of action.
38
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist indicated that had
Sosna sued only on her own behalf, the case would have been moot
and dismissal would have become the Court's only option.39 However,
the successful and proper certification of the class of unnamed plaintiffs
was found to confer "a legal status separate from the interest asserted
by the appellant" upon the anonymous claimants.
40
Having found that the case involved interests other than those of
the named party, the Court still had to ascertain whether the case con-
tinued as a live controversy or, if all controversy had ceased, whether
there was some basis for averting an article III dismissal.41 For this
purpose, the Court relied on an application of the mootness doctrine
which it first had articulated sixty-four years earlier 42 and which it had
revitalized in 1972, in Dunn v. Blumstein.
43
Dunn involved a Tennessee law which established residency re-
quirements for voting eligibility.44 A class action was filed challenging
the prerequisites, but by the time the district court issued its opinion,
the passage of time had mooted the named plaintiff's claim.45 None-
theless, a three-judge district court panel declined to dismiss the action,
holding that the problems which gave rise to the named plaintiff's ac-
tion were "capable of repetition" with regard to the members of the
certified class, but were "evading appellate review" because of the in-
the district court certified Sosna as class representative, it held that the challenged durational
residency requirement was constitutional.
35. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
36. Id at 398.
37. Id at 398 n.7.
38. Id at 398-99.
39. Id at 399.
40. Id
41. Id at 399-401.
42. See Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
In that case, the Court held that the expiration of an improper ICC injunction against a shipper
did not moot the controversy because similar injunctions could be issued in the future and the
question of their propriety could continue to escape review because of their limited duration. Id.
at 515-16.
43. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
44. Id at 334.
45. Id at 333 n.2. The election for which the named plaintiffs sought to register had taken
place, and the residency period would be satisfied by the named plaintiffs before the next regularly
scheduled election.
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ability of any one plaintiff to maintain a controversy for the entire du-
ration of the litigation.46 The Supreme Court approved this application
of the mootness doctrine.
47
In Sosna, the Court found the mootness doctrine as applied in
Dunn to be controlling.48 In so finding, the Court reiterated the impor-
tance of protecting the interests of the unnamed class members under
the general principles of article III.
49
Sosna involved a situation where the named plaintiff's claim was
extinguished after class certification had been granted by the district
court.5 0 However, the Court recognized, in dictum, that potential com-
plications could arise if the named representative's cause of action was
somehow mooted before the district court had a reasonable opportunity
to rule on the motion for class certification.5' The Court indicated that
in such a case a legal fiction might be used whereby the district court
would allow the certification to "relate back to the filing of the com-
plaint. ' 52 The propriety of invoking this fiction was to be determined
on the facts of each individual case, with particular attention being
given to the aspects of each controversy which were "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review."
'53
The Gerstein Opinion
Gerstein v. Pugh,5 4 decided shortly after Sosna, provided the set-
ting for the elevation of the "relation back" concept from dictum to
doctrinal status. The plaintiffs in Gerstein raised a constitutional chal-
lenge to Florida's pre-trial detention practices, but trial and conviction
mooted their claim before it could be considered by the district court.
Although the record of the case did not reveal whether the mootness
had occurred prior to, or after, the district court's granting of class cer-
tification, the Supreme Court justified its review of the case by applying
the "relation" back doctrine, having first determined that the case in-
volved a controversy of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
variety.55
46. Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Tenn. 1970).
47. 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972).
48. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 (1975). See also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24
(1974). But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam).
49. 419 U.S. 393, 402-03 (1975).
50. Id at 399.
51. Id at 402 n.il.
52. Id
53. Id
54. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
55. Id at 110 n.j 1. The fact that the mooting of the named claimants' actions in Gerstein
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Thus, after Sosna and Gerstein it is clear that a properly certified 56
class action is not automatically mooted by the resolution or satisfac-
tion of the named representative's claim. If the mooting of the named
plaintiff's cause of action occurs before the district court has had a rea-
sonable opportunity to consider and rule on the class certification mo-
tion, the following questions must be answered in the affirmative before
the relation back doctrine may be applied:
1. Was there a live controversy between the named plaintiff
and the defendant at the time the class action was brought
in the district court?
57
2. Did the named plaintiff, prior to the mooting of his claim,
file a proper motion for class certification?58
3. Was the named representative's cause of action mooted
before the district court could reasonably have been ex-
pected to consider and decide the certification motion?59
4. Was the gravamen of the named plaintiff's complaint in-
occurred through the passage of time and in the ordinary course of events has led some courts to
limit application of the relation back doctrine to cases where the time element causing mootness is
inherent in the nature of the controversy. See, e.g., Banks v. Multi-Family Management, Inc., 554
F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1977) (the time element was held not inherent in the plaintiffs' claim where
defendant-landlord consented to a permanent injunction barring plaintiffs' eviction); Inmates of
San Diego County Jail v. Duffy, 528 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1975) (the time element was held inherent
in plaintiffs' cause of action where first amendment claims of pre-trial detainees were mooted by
trial or release); Robinson v. Leahy, 73 F.RD. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (state prisoner's class suit
alleging a right to individualized treatment from a state social services agency was held mooted by
termination of plaintiff's incarceration because there was no evidence that other prisoners' terms
would bar them from bringing essentially the same action).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) states the prerequisites to certification. Rule 23(b) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(I) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party oppos-
ing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their abilit to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refusedto act on &rounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive reief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be en-
countered in the management of class action.
57. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
58. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
59. Id at 402 n.ll (1975).
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herently of such short duration that the normal pace of
judicial function did not allow the district court a reason-
ably opportunity to review the certification motion?
60
5. Has the district court subsequently certified the class and
approved the named plaintiff's continued participation as
class representative?
6'
6. Was the problem which gave rise to the action capable of
being repeated vis-a-vis the named plaintiff, the putative
class plaintiffs or potential future plaintiffs, and, if so, was
it likely to continue to evade adjudication?62
Pre-certification mootness cases which could not be aligned within
these parameters typically have been dismissed under the provisions of
article 111.63
The Seventh Circuit Approach
In Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Association,64 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed, al-
beit inadvertently, the pre-certification mootness issue after the United
States Supreme Court's treatment of this issue in Sosna and Gerstein.
In Winokur, the named plaintiffs alleged that the defendant banking
institutions had engaged in deceptive and misleading advertising with
regard to the interest that would be paid to depositors.65 A motion was
filed seeking certification of a class comprised of depositors who had
relied to their detriment on the defendants' advertisements.66 The dis-
trict court denied certification, indicating that "the questions of fact va-
ried almost on an individual basis, with material variations. . . in the
60. Id Accord, Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); Morales v. Minter, 393 F.
Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1975); Lugo v. Dumpson, 390 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
61. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.l (1975). See Board of School Comm'rs of Indianap-
olis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam), where the district court's failure to comply in full
with the requirements of rule 23(b) was held to be the functional equivalent of a denial of certifi-
cation.
62. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 (1975). But see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 754 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1977) (where county prisoners alleg-
ing substandard jail conditions were released before motion for class certification was filed);
Winokur v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932
(1978) (where named plaintiffs' claims were settled after the district court denied class certifica-
tion); Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1977) (where county prisoners asserting depriva-
tions of constitutional rights were released from jail following district court's refusal to certify a
class); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (where
named plaintiff, a minor challenging a state juvenile detention statute, was released from state
custody and supervision following the district court's refusal to consider the certification motion).
64. 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
65. Id at 272-73.
66. Id at 273.
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kinds or degrees of reliance by the depositors." 67 After the denial of
certification, the defendants tendered claimed damages and costs to the
named plaintiffs. 68 The defendants also altered the interest-crediting
practices that gave rise to the suit.69 The case was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit where the de-
nial of certification was affirmed.
70
In affirming the denial of class certification, the Seventh Circuit
relied on Sosna and subsequent Supreme Court holdings in cases in-
volving the extinction of the putative class representative's individual
claim.71 In doing so, the Winokur court formulated a number of gener-
alizations ostensibly derived from these holdings.72 The second of
these generalizations stated that where there has been no determination
of an action's suitability for maintenance as a class action, and the con-
troversy between the named plaintiff and the defendant is extinguished,
the case must be dismissed for want of a justiciable controversy. 73 This
was the state of the law at the time the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit decided Susman v. Lincoln American Corp.
SUSMAN V. LINCOLN AMERICAN CORP.
The Susman decision74 involves the companion cases Flamm v.
Eberstadt and Susman v. Lincoln American Corp. These two cases were
67. Id
68. Id at 274.
69. Id
70. Id at 277.
71. Id. at 276-77. The court of appeals relied on Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975)
(per curiam); Board of School Comm'rs of Indianapolis v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per
curiam).
72. The generalizations are:
(1) When, after an action is ordered maintained as a class action, the controversy
between the named party in his own interest and his opponent dies, court adjudication of
the merits remains appropriate because the interests of the class members are sufficiently
represented by the named party so that controversy between the class members and the
opponent is still alive and being litigated in the action.
(2) When there is no determination that an action be maintained as a class action
and the controversy between the named party in his own interest and his opponent dies,
court adjudication is not appropriate because there is no controversy between parties
who are present or represented before the court in the action.
(3) When the right to maintain a class action is denied and the trial court decides
the claim on its merits, the named party who is still interested in a live controversy, and
who sought to represent the class, is deemed to have standing to seek review of the
denial.
(4) In situation 3 a member of the proposed class may promptly intervene and
have standing to seek review of the denial even if the named party elects not to seek
review.
560 F.2d at 277.
73. Id
74. 587 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1978).
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consolidated on appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.
75
Facts
In Flamm v. Eberstadt, plaintiffs Ann and Arnold Flamm, mother
and son, had purchased and sold stock in Microdot, Inc. In a com-
plaint originally filed in 1976 in the federal district court, plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendant corporation and its agent, Eberstadt, made
false and material misstatements and omissions with regard to the sale
of the Microdot stock.76 Plaintiffs moved to have the court certify a
class consisting of "[a]ll sellers of the common stock of Microdot, Inc.
during the period beginning on December 5, 1975 and ending at the
close of business on January 23, 1976, excluding the defendants and
those in concert with them."
'77
Defendants Eberstadt and Microdot challenged the certification
motion, questioning the plaintiffs' fitness to fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.78 Defendants argued that the relationship
between the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel, when considered along
with the fact that potential attorney's fees in the case could well exceed
the probable individual recoveries, raised a strong possibility that the
plaintiffs' role as class representatives would come into conflict with
their personal interests as individual claimants.79 The district judge
agreed 80 and, pointing to the potential for a conflict of interest as well
as to possible ethical issues, denied certification of the class.8'
In Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., plaintiff Susman brought a
stockholder's derivative action, alleging that the defendants acted de-
ceptively and misstated and omitted material facts regarding the
purchase and sale of securities and the solicitation of proxies.
82 Sus-
man sought certification of a class comprised of common share stock-
holders in the Consumers National Corporation, a company Lincoln
American had acquired in a statutory merger. 83 Defendants opposed
the motion for class certification on virtually the same legal and factual
75. Id
76. Id





82. 587 F.2d at 866.
83. 561 F.2d 86, 89.
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basis as in Flamm.84 Relying on his earlier decision in Flamm, the dis-
trict judge declined to certify the class.
85
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the lower court denials of class status in both the Flamm and
Susman cases, noting that the plaintiffs were not barred from retaining
substitute counsel and refiling their actions either as individual plain-
tiffs or as putative class representatives.86 The plaintiffs in both cases
chose to pursue the latter course and, after obtaining different counsel,
reinstituted both suits as class actions, filing motions for class certifica-
tion along with their complaints in the district court.
87
After the plaintiffs had refiled their renewed actions and certifica-
tion motions, but before the court had an opportunity to consider and
rule on the motions, the defendants in both cases tendered full mone-
tary damages including the amounts plaintiffs claimed as losses as well
as properly chargeable costs.8 8 Relying on the earlier Seventh Circuit
holding in Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Association,89 the
district court ruled that the tender mooted the plaintiffs' claims and that
article III mandated dismissal of the cases. 90 In dismissing the action
in Flamm, the district court stated that the second generalization of the
Winokur court is the "rule of law applicable to the case at bar."9' The
district court dismissals in Flamm and Susman were appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit where the cases
again were consolidated for review.
92
The Seventh Circuit's Reasoning
In reviewing the district court decisions, the court of appeals rec-
ognized that the inexactitude of its language in Winokur had resulted
in an inequitable outcome contrary to the policies underlying the repre-
sentative action device. Accordingly, the Susman court limited the lan-
guage of the second Winokur generalization so as to exclude cases
where the motion for class certification was pending before the district
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id at 96.
87. 587 F.2d at 868.
88. Id at 868-69.
89. 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 64-73 supra and 113-23 infra.
90. Flamm v. Eberstadt, No. 76 C 427 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1977); Susman v. Lincoln American
Corp., No. 73 C 1089 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1978).
91. No. 76 C 427, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1977).
92. 587 F.2d at 868. The consolidated case in the Seventh Circuit will hereinafter be referred
to as Susman.
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court and where mootness of the named plaintiff's complaint was "arti-
ficially created" at the defendant's behest.
93
The Susman case, as the court of appeals pointed out, was not one
for treatment under the relation back doctrine.94 The fact that the
named plaintiffs' claims had not been inherently of short duration and
had been mooted by the defendants' intentional conduct rather than by
"the mere passage of time," made Susman an inappropriate context for
invoking the relation back fiction. 95 Cognizant of the potent equitable
and policy considerations96 which militated against dismissal in Sus-
man, the Seventh Circuit turned to Sosna and Gerstein in search of a
solution.
The court of appeals interpreted Sosna as standing for the proposi-
tion that although article III requirements must be met in all federal
court litigation, they should not be interpreted and applied dogmati-
cally, especially if such procedural pedantry "would prevent some
otherwise justiciable claims from ever being subject to judicial re-
view."' 97 According to the court of appeals, the mandate of Sosna and
Gerstein is, broadly speaking, that under certain circumstances, in the
context of class actions, courts may use their discretion in determining
whether the constitutional requirements of justiciability are fulfilled in
a given action.98 Where necessity dictates, this discretion may extend
to include the formulation of legal fictions and constructs, such as the
relation back doctrine.
99
The court of appeals then held that the filing and pursuit "with
reasonable diligence" of a motion for class certification by the named
plaintiffs acts provisionally to bring the interests of the putative class
members before the court and into conflict with the interests of the de-
fendant. 100 This, the court indicated, is sufficient to fulfill the constitu-
tional requisite of functional adversity should the defendant act to
moot the named representative's claim during the pendency of the cer-
93. Id at 869. See note 72 and text accompanying note 73 supra for a description of the
second Winokur generalization.
94. Id at 870.
95. Id See also text accompanying note 60 supra.
96. Foremost among these considerations is prevention of abuse of the class action device. It
not only would be inequitable to allow defendants to buy out of class-wide liability, it would also
subvert the objectives of judicial efficiency and increased access to the courts which underlie the
rule 23 action.
97. 587 F.2d at 870.
98. Id
99. Id See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.l 1(1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
402 n.ll (1975).
100. 587 F.2d at 870.
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tification motion.' 0 ' The Seventh Circuit then remanded the cases to
the district court for determinations on the class certification motions




The Seventh Circuit's development of a rule sharply reducing the
potential for pre-certification mooting induced by defendants' tender of
monetary damages to named plaintiffs is responsive to what may be
termed the mandate of Sosna v. Iowa.10 3 In resolving the tension be-
tween the mootness doctrine and the class action device, the Sosna
Court did not lose sight of the primary function of the class action or
the compelling policy considerations underlying its creation: the pro-
tection and determination of legitimate claims and interests of similarly
situated litigants with claims too small to warrant individual case litiga-
tion.t04 In addition, utilization of the representative action device pro-
motes judicial efficiency and economy.
0 5
In Sosna, the United States Supreme Court evinced a willingness
to "shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciability to
the ability of the class representative to 'fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.' "106 This, the Court indicated, is appropriate
in cases where the interplay between the "practical demands of time"
in the functioning of the courts and the article III "cases and controver-
sies" provision "would permit a significant class of federal claims to
remain unredressed for want of a spokesman who could retain a per-
sonal adversary position throughout the course of the litigation."'
' 0 7
Although the Sosna majority admonished that the holding "in no
way detracts from the firmly established requirement that the judicial
power of Art. III courts extends only to 'cases and controversies' speci-
fied in that Article,"108 their words were belied by the creation of one
fiction and the suggestion of another. The Sosna holding that class
101. Id at 869.
102. Id at 873.
103. 419 U.S. 393 (1975). See text accompanying notes 31-53 supra.
104. Id at 401 n.9 (1975). The Court acknowledged that a "blanket" application of the moot-
ness doctrine to class actions "would permit a significant class of federal claims to remain un-
redressed for want of a spokesman who could retain a personal adversary position throughout the
course of the litigation." Id
105. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1322.
106. 419 U.S. at 403.
107. See note 104 supra.
108. 419 U.S. at 402.
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certification brings the interests of the unnamed class plaintiffs into
controversy with those of the defendant is itself a fiction. The relation
back device suggested in a footnote'0 9 of Sosna is clearly a fiction as
well. Justice White, in his dissent to Sosna, asserted that the majority's
formulation "dilutes the jurisdictional command of Art. III to a mere
prudential guideline."" l0 The subsequent ratification, in Gerstein v.
Pugh,I l of the relation back fiction as a means of "fulfilling" the de-
mands of article III served to further underscore the perception that the
Supreme Court no longer interprets the constitutional provision as a
demand for the existence of a live controversy throughout the course of
class action litigation. Indeed, the Court's creation of the relation back
construct indicates a readiness to stretch traditional concepts of jus-
ticiability when necessary to fit meritorious class actions within the lib-
eralized confines of Sosna.t" 2 The lesson of Sosna and Gerstein is that
where the strict application of the cases and controversies requirement
works to defeat the principal function of the class action device, the
federal courts may resort to fictions, constructs and other formulas to
find satisfaction of the article III provision. It is with this mandate that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set out to
refine and expand, albeit narrowly, the law of the circuit.
The Winokur Correction
In dismissing the claims of the Susmans and the Flamms, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois consid-
ered itself bound by the 1977 Seventh Circuit holding in Winokur v.
Bell Federal Savings & Loan Association. 1 3 The Winokur court had
sought to clarify and distill the reasoning utilized by the Supreme
Court in Sosna and subsequent cases dealing with the problem that
mooting of the named representative's cause poses for class actions.
Toward this end, the court of appeals formulated four generalizations
which purported to summarize the state of the law.' 14 An inherent
weakness of generalizations, however, is that they often cut a broader
swath than is either necessary or appropriate. That proved to be the
shortcoming of the second Winokur generalization,' 15 largely because
109. Id at402 n.11.
110. Id at 412 (White, J., dissenting).
111. 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11 (1975). See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
112. See 420 U.S. at 110 n.l1.
113. 560 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). See text accompanying
notes 65-73 supra.
114. Id at 277. See note 72 supra.
115. Id
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of the Seventh Circuit's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in
Board of School Commissioners of Indianapolis v. Jacobs."I6
The Jacobs Court, in a per curiam opinion, had held that the dis-
trict court's failure to observe rule 23 provisions for "proper" certifica-
tion' 7 amounted to a denial of the motion for class certification."
8
The named plaintiffs' complaints having been mooted by the passage of
time, the Court accordingly remanded the case for dismissal under the
basic Sosna rule." 19 The Jacobs case, because of its unique and some-
what confused factual underpinning, 120 is best viewed as an aberration
among post-Sosna Supreme Court decisions. At least one circuit has
indicated that Jacobs ought to be looked upon as being limited to its
facts.' 2 ' The Seventh Circuit's reliance on Jacobs is all the more curi-
ous in light of the court of appeals' failure, in Winokur, to even men-
tion the Gerstein holding. 
22
The Winokur court compounded the confusion by an inept word-
ing of the generalization which it derived from Jacobs. In Winokur,
the court of appeals phrased its second generalization to state:
When there is no determination that an action be maintained as a
class action and the controversy between the named party in his own
interest and his opponent dies, court adjudication is not appropriate
because there is no controversy between the parties who are present
or represented before the court in the action.'
23
What the court failed to perceive was that two distinct sets of circum-
stances could be encompassed by such phraseology. On the one hand,
there is "no determination that an action be maintained as a class ac-
tion" when there has been a consideration and subsequent denial of a
certification motion by the district court. On the other hand, if a dis-
116. 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam).
117. Id at 130.
118. Id at 129-30.
119. Id at 130.
120. In Jacobs, the record did not reveal whether the named plaintiff high school students had
filed their motion for class certification before graduation mooted their claims. Further, the dis-
trict court's non-compliance with certification procedure was held against the plaintiffs by the
Court, which remanded for dismissal.
121. See Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.), petitionfor cert.
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1978), where the court of appeals held that:
In light of Gerstein, handed down on the same day as Jacobs, and of Baxter and McDon-
ald, both decided after Jacobs, the Jacobs case should not be viewed as standing for the
proposition that the federal courts are constitutionally barred from continuing to adjudi-
cate disputes when the named plaintiff no longer retains his claim. . . . Consequently,
the holding of Jacobs is perhaps best understood as a specific instance ....
579 F.2d at 250. Both Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), and United Airlines v. McDon-
ald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), dealt with the issue of whether putative class members ought to be
permitted to intervene for purposes of appeal after the mooting of the named plaintiff's claim.
122. See 560 F.2d 271.
123. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
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trict court is not allowed a reasonable amount of time to consider a
certification motion and can make no ruling at all, then too "no deter-
mination" of suitability for class action maintenance is made. The crit-
ical distinction, of course, is that in the first instance some
determination has been made. 24 The district court has had an oppor-
tunity to review the interests of all putative parties to the action, both
named and unnamed, and the protections of rule 23(c) 25 have been
accorded if and where appropriate. In the second situation, exempli-
fied by the facts of Susman, the district court is not given a reasonable
opportunity to consider and rule on the motion for certification. Quite
literally, there is "no determination," pro or con, whether a class of
unnamed plaintiffs exists or whether the named plaintiff is a suitable
class representative.
The lower court's dismissals in Susman demonstrated to the Sev-
enth Circuit the devastating use to which such an overbroad rule could
be put by ingenious defendants confronted with potential class action
liability. Where the named plaintiff's individual claim is for a rela-
tively small sum of money or for some conduct easily provided on an
individual basis, a defendant upon notice of the filing of a class action,
could tender full damages (or perform or refrain from performing the
claimed conduct) and moot the named plaintiff's cause of action. The
possibility of such misuse was apparent to Judge Swygert, who dis-
sented from the Seventh Circuit's denial of a rehearing in Winokur. In
his dissent, Judge Swygert stated:
The unfortunate consequences of the rule formulated in this decision
on future consumer class actions are plain: defendants in such ac-
tions are now given the arbitrary power to bar appellate review by
simply tendering the damages claimed by the putative class represen-
tative. Rather than go to trial and face the potential payment of
damages which might be assessed in a class suit, defendants will pay
off the named plaintiff or plaintiffs thereby mooting the entire case. I
think justice dictates that the right to judicial review should not be
denied under the circumstances.
26
The Susman dismissals convinced the court of appeals that the
danger foreseen by Judge Swygert was very real and, unless remedied,
could pose a threat to the survival of the plaintiff class action in the
124. Denial of certification coupled with subsequent mooting of the named plaintiff's claim
would, absent timely intervention, result in a standard article III dismissal.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) demands the "best notice practicable under the circumstances" to
all identifiable class members. The rule also provides for exclusion from the class at members'
request and for entry of appearance through counsel. Id
126. 562 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1977) (Swygert, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
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Seventh Circuit. 1 27 Accordingly, the court of appeals limited the lan-
guage of its second Winokur generalization to exclude those cases
where a motion for class certification, which has been pursued with
reasonable diligence and is pending before the district court, is not re-
viewed because the named plaintiff's complaint is mooted by defend-
ant's tender of full money damages.1
28
Toward a Substantive Rule
In Susman, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was con-
fronted with the problem of devising a plausible basis for finding on
the facts that there was a live controversy in the case. Absent such a
determination, Sosna's requirement that a live controversy exist at the
time of class certification would bar the court of appeals from remand-
ing the cases to the district court for a ruling on class suit maintainabil-
ity.
The policy considerations involved are of substantial magnitude.
The utility of the class action device as a means of protecting and pro-
moting the interests of similarly situated small claimants while foster-
ing economy of adjudication within the courts, is jeopardized if the
action is dismissed. The equities in the case also militate for a rule
which would at least allow the district court to consider the certification
motion and decide whether a legitimate class of nameless claimants ex-
ists. As the Seventh Circuit noted, a rule which enables putative class
action defendants to "buy out" from class-wide liability by paying off
only the named plaintiffs "could prevent the courts from ever reaching
the class issues . . . even in cases where a class action would be most
clearly appropriate."'
' 29
The Seventh Circuit indicated that the relation back doctrine was
inapposite on the Susman facts because the named plaintiffs' claims
were mooted by intentional conduct of one of the parties, and not by a
durational element inherent in the cause of action. 130 Language in
Gerstein describing the mooted claim as "by nature temporary" sup-
127. See 587 F.2d at 870.
128. Although the Susman court limited its holding to those situations where the defendants
tender monetary damages claimed by the named plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit subsequently held,
in DeBrown v. Trainor, No. 76-1628 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 1979), that Susman encompasses "remedial
actions taken by the defendants while a motion for class certification is pending ... " Id, slip
op. at 5 (emphasis added). Since, in DeBrown, the remedial action taken was the granting of
retroactive food stamp benefits, it is apparent that Susman may now be read as including conduct




ports an interpretation that the relation back doctrine was not available
in Susman, and, in fact, that is the way the relation back doctrine has
been applied by the majority of the federal courts.'
3'
Unable to utilize any of the then-existing class action mootness
exceptions, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit devised one of
its own. The court reasoned that if rights or interests accrue -to the
putative class members by virtue of the named plaintiff's filing of a
motion for class certification, then mooting of the named plaintiff's
cause of action, during the pendency of the motion, would not extin-
guish all controversy in the case because the putative class members'
claims would still be viable.
The court of appeals recited three interests of potential class mem-
bers which exist even prior to a decision on certification. The first of
these is the right to support or challenge the certification of the class or
to assail the named plaintiff's suitability to serve as class representa-
tive.132 Another pre-certification interest enumerated by the court was
the tolling of the statute of limitations on all individual causes of ac-
tion, by virtue of the filing of a class action complaint. 133 Finally, the
court of appeals cited the putative class plaintiffs' right to be informed
of, and possibly included in, settlements occurring before class certifi-
cation. 34 According to the court of appeals, these interests "suffi-
ciently, though provisionally, [brought] the interests of class members
before the court so that the apparent conflict between their interests and
those of the defendant" would preserve the requisite controversy before
the court.
135
There are a number of weaknesses in the court's reasoning. The
United States Supreme Court has held that, at minimum, article III
requires one litigant on each side of the controversy to have "a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure . . . concrete ad-
verseness."1 36 After Sosna, a class action need not remain in this pos-
ture for the entire duration of the litigation, but the article III
controversy requirement must be met at the time the action is instituted
and at the time the class is certified. While all of the interests recounted
131. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
132. 587 F.2d at 870. The court of appeals cited Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n,
395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973), in support of this proposition.
133. 587 F.2d at 870. In so concluding, the court cited American Pipe & Construction Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
134. 587 F.2d at 869. The court drew this conclusion from Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
135. 587 F.2d at 869 (emphasis added).
136. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
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by the Susman court appear to give putative class plaintiffs an interest,
if not a personal stake, in the pre-certification phase of a class suit, only
the right to be included in a settlement places the potential class plain-
tiffs in an adversary position vis-a-vis the defendants.
The ability to endorse or oppose class certification or to question
the suitability of the putative class representative is a right that poten-
tial class members have with regard to the party seeking to prosecute
the class suit. The right to withdraw oneself from inclusion in a class
action is specified in rule 23(c)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 137 and generally is used to remove a party from a real or
potential controversy. Although a putative unnamed class member
may oppose the certification of the class, such opposition generally is
brought to the court's attention in the hearing on the motion for class
certification. Prior to that time, the potential class member is essen-
tially a spectator to the proceedings. A challenge to the adequacy of
the named plaintiff's efforts on behalf of the class is basically a squab-
ble among plaintiffs, and while it may affect the identity of the defend-
ant's opponent, it does not place the unnamed potential plaintiffs in a
posture adversary to that of the defendant.
Similar criticisms may be leveled at the remaining interests relied
on by the Seventh Circuit. The tolling of the statute of limitations af-
fects the potential class plaintiff's right to litigate a legitimate claim.
The tolling also affects the defendant because it extends the period dur-
ing which he is vulnerable to a judgment. However, these interests are
not placed in an adverse position unless the putative unnamed class
plaintiff either is included in a certified class or brings suit on his own
behalf.
The court of appeals' reasoning in support of the final interest is
tenuous as well. The court relied on Kahan v. Rosensteil'38 for the
proposition that potential class members, even before certification,
have a right to be notified of, and possibly included in, a settlement.
Yet there is no discussion in the Kahan holding of the issue of notice of
or inclusion in settlements, as a matter of right. In Kahan, the defend-
ant had intentionally and willingly made settlement offers to the poten-
tial class members, and the issue on appeal was whether the named
plaintiff would recover attorney's fees from the defendant. The Kahan
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) states, in pertinent part:
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if
he so requests by a specified date. . ..
138. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
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court did state, however, that a suit brought as a class action should be
treated as such for the purposes of dismissal or compromise.
Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 139 governs dis-
missal or compromise of class actions. The rule requires notice to "all
members of the class"14° of an impending settlement or compromise.
This poses a problem because the existence of a class as well as the
identity of its members is not formally established until the class is cer-
tified. 4 t Prior to that time, there is only the named plaintiff's assertion
that a class of litigants exists. As for the possibility of inclusion in a
compromise or settlement, the short answer is that a defendant may
indeed offer to settle the claims of the uncertified class plaintiffs, de-
pending, probably, on his assessment of the potential for even greater
liability after full litigation. The settlement or compromise, with regard
to the uncertified class, is a voluntary act of a defendant based on a
calculation of what might occur should his interests ever be placed into
an adversary posture vis-a-vis the class plaintiffs.
Finally, there is no indication that the interests discussed above are
brought before the court exclusively by the motion for class certifica-
tion. Indeed, all of these interests may accrue to the putative class
members by virtue of the filing of the class suit alone. Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit's assertion that the filing and pursuit with reasonable dili-
gence of a class certification motion brings the interests of the unnamed
class members into conflict with those of the defendant is of doubtful
merit.
However, an argument for finding a live controversy on the Sus-
man facts-a reverse fiction of sorts-may be drawn from the reason-
ing employed by the Seventh Circuit. Although the interests described
by the court of appeals in support of its "conflicting interests" formula-
tion do not necessarily place the unnamed class plaintiff in an adverse
position with regard to the defendant, they do place substantial respon-
sibility on the named plaintiff, even before the class is certified.
In a concurrence to Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,'
42
Chief Judge Seitz of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
139. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e) states:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court,
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs.
140. Id
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) enumerates the criteria for identifying a certifiable class. See note
56 supra.
142. 559 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1977) (Seitz, C.J., concurring), af'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978). In Gard-
ner, the plaintiff alleged sex discrimination in the defendant's employment practices. The plaintiff
moved for certification of a class. The district court denied certification and the plaintiff immedi-
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Circuit proposed that the requisite controversy could be found by rea-
soning that the named plaintiff, by filing a class suit, not only asserts his
individual interests, but also claims to be a fiduciary on behalf of the
putative class. 143 The defendant, by denying class liability, implicitly
challenges the existence of a class of litigants and the named plaintiff's
assumption of fiduciary responsibility for the class. That challenge
provides the requisite spark of controversy, even if the named plaintiff
loses his individual cause of action. Since the existence of a proper
class and the named plaintiff's fitness to represent it are not decided
until the district court's ruling on class certification, the controversy be-
tween the named plaintiff and the defendant on the issue of fiduciary
status will not wane until that time. This would fulfill the Sosma re-
quirement of a live controversy at the time the class is certified.
Such an approach concededly is as much a legal fiction as are the
relation back or Susman approaches to the article III requirement.
However, it may be less assailable, on the same facts, than the Susman
fiction. The named plaintiff does assume a fiduciary responsibility
when a class suit is filed. Even before certification, the named plaintiff
must seek court approval for a settlement or dismissal of the action.'44
The court may order the named plaintiff to give notice to all members
regarding any element in the conduct of the action. 45 In order to se-
cure certification as class representative, the named plaintiff must show
that he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
146
That a named plaintiff may bring a motion for certification of the class,
most of the members of which are complete strangers in whose per-
sonal welfare the named plaintiff has no particular interest, is indica-
tive of some type of fiduciary relationship arising out of the filing of the
class suit. Because the fiduciary issue, as formulated, is raised by the
filing of a class suit and survives at least until there is a ruling on the
certification motion, this is a particularly useful fiction for avoiding
pre-certification mootness.
In spite of its shortcomings, Susman is properly decided. The no-
tion that potential class defendants may evade justice by tendering triv-
ial damage settlements to the named plaintiffs clearly is offensive. Such
abuse of the class action not only forecloses the adjudication of legiti-
ately appealed the denial. The Third Circuit granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the ap-
peal, holding that denial of class certification is not the proper subject of interlocutory appeal.
143. Id at 219.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). See note 139 supra.
145. Id
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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mate claims but also forces potential class litigants to seek relief on an
individual basis, thereby adding to the congestion in the federal
courts. 147 This defeats the basic function of the representative class ac-
tion. Susman is a first, albeit tentative, step towards curtailing this
problem.
Analyses Applied in Other Circuits
By deciding Susman as it did, the Seventh Circuit aligned itself
with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits. In White v. Mathews,148 the named plaintiff challenged delays
associated with administrative hearings that are required under the So-
cial Security Act to determine eligibility for disability insurance bene-
fits. 149 During the pendency of the motion for class certification, the
named claimant received the desired hearing before an administrative
law judge.1 50 Nevertheless, the district court proceeded to certify the
class and rendered a judgment on the merits for the plaintiffs. 51 The
defendants appealed, asserting that satisfaction of the named plaintiff's
claim mooted the controversy and that, as a result, the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case.' 52
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's ruling in White, relying exclusively on
Sosna.153 The court of appeals applied a "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" analysis, noting that delayed administrative hearings
would continue to be a reality for members of the class and that the
Social Security Administration could avoid adjudication of the issue by
providing hearings to those plaintiffs who request, but have not yet se-
cured, certification of a class.154 Moreover, the court found that in light
of the totality of the circumstances, the case was not moot. 155 The Sec-
ond Circuit focused on the district court's consideration of the class
certification motion as a critical stage in the process of ascertaining and
protecting the interests of the putative class. 156 The court of appeals
147. More realistically, many litigants simply abandon any efforts at securing the relief to
which they are entitled.
148. 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
149. Id at 854.
150. Id at 855.
151. Id
152. Id at 856.
153. Id at 857. Although several issues were presented on appeal, the court found Sosna to





stated: "a district court should have enough time to consider these im-
portant issues of class status carefully. . . . [Tihe main reason for re-
quiring that the named plaintiff have a 'live' controversy is to assure
adequate representation of the interests of the class."'
57
In Roper v. Consurve, Inc. ,158 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit also focused on the procedural safeguards ac-
corded the interests of the unnamed members of the proposed class. In
Roper, two holders of BankAmericard credit cards sued on behalf of
themselves and all other Mississippi cardholders, alleging that the
credit plan's monthly service charge was usurious.' 59 Upon review of
the certification motion, the district court found that although a class of
litigants existed, the named plaintiffs were inadequate class representa-
tives. 160 Shortly after the denial of certification, the defendants ten-
dered to the named plaintiffs the maximum amount that each could
have recovered. 16' Over plaintiffs' objection, the district court entered
judgment for the plaintiffs. Although the Fifth Circuit reversed the de-
nial of certification and remanded the case for further proceedings as a
class action, the court of appeals implicitly recognized that the district
court's consideration and ruling on the certification motion provided an
adequate determination of the interests of potential class members.
162
However, the Fifth Circuit specifically acknowledged the risks for puta-
tive class plaintiffs which are posed by pre-certification dismissals or
settlements. 63 Citing its earlier holding in Pearson v. Ecological Sci-
ence Corp. ,164 the court of appeals underscored the importance of as-
suring that the safeguards of rule 23(e) 165 be observed in the context of
pre-certification dismissals as well. 166 Notice of a dismissal or compro-
mise, as well as the right to challenge such a disposition, must be af-
forded any individual whose rights may be affected by that
157. Id
158. 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.), petitionfor cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3422 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1978).
159. Id at 1109.
160. Id at 1111.
161. Id at 1109. The plaintiffs never accepted the offered settlement, but the district court
entered judgment based on the offer.
162. Id at 1110. The court indicated that where a determination has been made under rule
23(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that class action status is not appropriate, and
where settlement or dismissal will not adversely affect the interests of individuals not before the
court, the notice provision of rule 23(e) is not applicable. See note 139 supra.
163. Id at 1110. The court held that "[pirior to certification a class action cannot be dismissed
merely because the representatives are satisfied, unless there is notice to the putative class of the
proposed dismissal and a determination by the court that the dismissal is proper, as required by
rule 23(e) ... " Id
164. 522 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
165. See note 139 supra.
166. 578 F.2d at !110.
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disposition. 67 The Roper court stated:
The notion that a defendant may short-circuit a class action by pay-
ing off the class representatives either with their acquiescence or, as
here, against their will, deserves short shrift. Indeed, were it so easy
to end class actions, few would survive. . . . By the very act of filing
a class action, the class representatives assume responsibilities to the
members of the class. They may not terminate their duties by taking
satisfaction; a cease-fire may not be pressed upon them by paying
their claims.'
68
This language was quoted by the Seventh Circuit as being "consistent"
with its reasoning in Susman.169 However, the Susman court expressly
limited its holding to "the fairly narrow situation where a motion for
certification has been pursued with reasonable diligence and is pending
when a tender is made."1 70 This limitation is appropriate to the extent
that it may act as a test of the named plaintiff's good faith in filing a
class suit.
The Roper court also addressed the potential misuse of class ac-
tions by plaintiffs who seek to collect "quick, undeserved damages" in
so-called "strike suits.'' Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that sat-
isfaction of representatives' claims prior to a determination on the cer-
tification motion will not result in dismissal of a class action unless the
district court determines that dismissal is proper. 72 The court held that
this is applicable whether the settlement is forced upon, or solicited by,
the named plaintiffs.173 The Fifth Circuit indicated that "[t]he court
itself has special responsibilities to ensure that the dismissal does not
prejudice putative members."' 74 However, the court of appeals did not
specify whether the decision as to the propriety of the dismissal was to
be made at an expedited hearing on the certification motion or whether
the district court, upon learning of a proposed settlement, was to initi-
ate its own fact-finding proceeding.
The holdings in White, Roper, and Susman are all in diametric
contradiction to the Eighth Circuit's holding in Bradley v. Housing Au-
thority of Kansas City.175 In Bradley, four applicants for public hous-
167. In Pearson, the Fifth Circuit noted that some courts, in an effort to protect the interests of
the unnamed class members during the period between the filing of the suit and the certification
determination, have presumed that class action status is proper for the purposes of the rule 23(e)
notice requirements. 522 F.2d at 177. See also text accompanying notes 138-41 supra.
168. 578 F.2d at 1110.
169. 587 F.2d at 870-7 1.
170. Id at 871.




175. 512 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1975).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ing brought a class action alleging that the defendant housing
authority's tenant admission policies favored higher income appli-
cants. 176 The defendant gave apartments to the named plaintiffs before
the district court could rule on the class certification motion. The dis-
trict court did not consider the motion for certification which was pend-
ing at the time of the offer and dismissed the action as moot. 177 In
affirming the dismissal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Board of
School Commissioners of Indianapolis v. Jacobs. 78 The Eighth Circuit
held that "dismissal is required by the case or controversy provisions of
Article III when the claims of all the named plaintiffs become moot
before certification of the class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(C)(1)."', 79 The
court of appeals acknowledged that Sosna did allow for the possibility
that the named plaintiffs' complaint may, in some circumstances, be-
come moot before the district court has a reasonable opportunity to
rule on the motion for class certification.1 80 The Bradley court also
noted that the defendants had acted deliberately to moot the issue as to
the named plaintiffs. 81 Nevertheless, the court of appeals indicated
that real and potential complications on remand 82 militated for dis-
missal of the action. 83 In so doing, the court of appeals assumed that
there would be willing plaintiffs waiting to reinstitute and prosecute the
action on behalf of whatever class may still exist. Thus, although a new
suit would have the appropriate motion for certification and possibly a
ruling would be made on that motion, the possibility existed that no
new suit would be brought for lack of a class member with sufficient
resources to represent the class. This, in turn, could mean that putative
members of the Bradley class, who had legitimate complaints against
the housing authority but lacked sufficient individual resources to com-
mence litigation on their own behalf, would be left without redress for
their grievances.
176. Id at 627.
177. Id
178. Id at 628. See notes 115-21 supra and accompanying text.
179. 512 F.2d at 628. The court here misread the Jacobs holding, as did the Seventh Circuit in
Winokur. See text accompanying notes 114-25 supra.
180. 512 F.2d at 628.
181. Id at 627, 629.
182. Id at 629. The plaintiffs conceded that substantial amendments to the complaint would
have to be made on remand. The court decided that the problems posed by the need for class
redefinition outweighed the risks which dismissal posed for unnamed class plaintiffs in Bradley.
Id
183. Id The court stated: "Theoretically, new parties would intervene [to prosecute the ac-
tion on behalf of the class]." However, the court did not indicate whether there was any basis for
presuming that the "theory" would be put into practice after dismissal. Id
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In spite of its ambiguity, Roper presents the better rule. By al-
lowing some sort of evaluation, whether on the certification motion or
on another basis, the Fifth Circuit moved to avoid the harshness of the
Bradley rule-the needless dismissal and subsequent reinstitution on
an individual basis of legitimate class claims. By ensuring that some
attempt will be made at reviewing, prior to dismissal, all the interests at
stake in a proposed class action, the Roper holding reduced the poten-
tial for abuse of the class action by plaintiffs and defendants alike. The
Fifth Circuit better assessed and responded to the same policy consid-
erations and equitable principles that the Seventh Circuit accommo-
dated with reticence and circumspection in Susman.
CONCLUSION
In Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the equitable and policy di-
lemmas posed by defendant-induced mooting of the named plaintiff's
claims during the pre-certification stage of class actions. The Seventh
Circuit properly interpreted the United States Supreme Court's willing-
ness to avoid dogmatism in devising ways for finding satisfaction of the
article III provision, especially when there are compelling policy incen-
tives. However, the Seventh Circuit's formula for finding the requisite
adversity in Susman fell short of meeting even the minimal case and
controvery requirements. An alternate fiction, relying on the fiduciary
responsibilities of the named plaintiff to the putative class members,
was suggested as a better means to the same end, that is, finding the
spark of controversy alive in a case at the time that the district court
certifies the class.
While the Susman holding was a positive but cautious step toward
preventing abuse of the representative action device, a more vigorous
approach has been suggested by the Fifth Circuit. That court ruled
that no pre-certification dismissal should be permitted, whether at de-
fendant's or plaintiff's behest, until the district court is satisfied that
such dismissal is proper. Taken in combination with the "fiduciary
fiction" for satisfaction of the article III requirement, the Roper rule of
the Fifth Circuit affords better protection against misuse of the class
action and subversion of its intended functions. The Seventh Circuit
should consider adopting such a rule.
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